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A QUICK LOOK AT THE INTER-AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC CHARTER OF THE OAS: WHAT IS IT
AND IS IT "LEGAL"?
Timothy D. Rudy•
INTRODUCTION

As the fourth anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter (Democratic Charter) 1 approaches, the public intergovernmental
international organization for the Western Hemisphere (the
Organization of American States or OAS) has decided its Secretary
General should study how the Democratic Charter has been
implemented and make proposals on how to address anti-democratic
situations in times of political fragility. 2
The highest political body of the OAS-the General Assembly3-

•Timothy D. Rudy was an attorney in the Department of Legal Affairs and Services at the
OAS. In 2006, at the time this article was written, he became an associate counsel with the
Board of Veterans' Appeals at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Rudy received his
B.A. from the University of Chicago (1975); obtained a master's degree in journalism from
Northwestern University (1978); earned his J.D. from the University of Akron (1991); and
received a LL.M. in international and comparative law from Georgetown University Law
Center (1994). Rudy wishes to thank Stephanie Casey, a 2005 summer intern in the OAS
legal office, for her assistance in preparing this article. Casey, a native of Brazil, is a secondyear law student at American University's Washington College of Law. This article was
developed from a panel presentation the author made on March 31, 2005 at the American
Society of International Law, which in tum, was based, in part, on two articles he coauthored with Dr. Enrique Lagos, former OAS Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs: In
Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 283 (2004); The Third Summit of
the Americas and the Thirty-First Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AMER. J. INT'L
L. 173 (2002). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and are not
attributed to Dr. Lagos or the OAS.
1. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l (2001), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/
AG/Res.l (XXVIII-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001), 40 1.L.M. 1289 (2001)
[hereinafter Democratic Charter], available at http://www.oas.org (follow "Welcome"
hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink: and choose "Democratic
Charter") (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
2. Declaration of Florida: Delivering the Benefits of Democracy, paras. 2-3, 35th Sess.
of the OAS General Assembly, AG/DEC. 41 (XXXV-0/05), OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.4496/05,
(June 13, 2005) (adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session held June 7, 2005) [hereinafter
Declaration of Florida].
3. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A, OEA/Ser.
A/2(SEPF)Add., by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66,
OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. OEA
Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol of Managua, June
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took this decision, and another to invoke Article 18 of the Democratic
Charter in the case of Nicaragua, 4 at its 2005 annual meeting in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, in June. (However, the General Assembly took no
action when the president of Bolivia resigned while the OAS was
meeting.)5
About two months before that General Assembly, this writer gave
a presentation on the Democratic Charter at the annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law (ASIL ). This article briefly
discusses the Democratic Charter-its creation, its perhaps murky legal
status, and Chapter IV. But I have added new developments that took
place after the ASIL meeting which further indicate the Democratic
Charter represents an important expression of the progressive
development of international law
First, I want to say that my comments are purely my own and do
not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of the Organization of
American States (OAS), any Member State, the General Secretariat, or
its legal department.
Democracy is a page one topic today, but I never hear the
Democratic Charter mentioned in news stories and television
broadcasts. President George W. Bush's Second Inaugural Address in
January was devoted to democracy, but did not once mention the
Democratic Charter, 6 which every country in the Western Hemisphere
(with the exception of Cuba) approved by a resolution of the OAS

10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the integrated
available
at
text
reflecting
all
four
amendments
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ch
arter.html (last visited February 6, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
4. See Support to Nicaragua, pmbl. para. 4, 35th Sess. of the OAS General Assembly,
AG/DEC. 43 (XXXV-0/05), OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.4496/05 (June 13, 2005) (adopted at the
Fourth Plenary Session held June 7, 2005) [hereinafter Support to Nicaragua] (stating:
"BEARING IN MIND ALSO Article 18 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which
establishes that when situations arise in a member state that may affect the development of
its democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power, the
Secretary General or the Permanent Council of the OAS may, with prior consent of the
government concerned, arrange for visits or other actions in that country .... ").
5. The Draft Declaration of the General Assembly on the Situation in Bolivia recited
six paragraphs concluding with an "express[ion of] the readiness of the Organization of
American States to provide all cooperation that may be requested by the legitimate Bolivian
authorities to facilitate dialogue as a means of surmounting the crisis and guaranteeing the
preservation of democratic institutions." AG/DEC. 42 (XXXV-0/05), OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.
4496/05 (June 7, 2005).
6. See President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address at the 55th Inaugural
(Jan.
20,
2005),
available
at
Ceremony
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html. (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
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General Assembly, on September 11, 2001. 7
Democratic government is required for every country in the
Western Hemisphere. 8 But the Democratic Charter takes this internal
domestic right and establishes it as an external collective right as well. 9
The first article of the Democratic Charter clearly states that it is "[t]he
peoples of the Americas [who] have a right to democracy and their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it." 10
Chapter IV of the Democratic Charter is entitled "Strengthening
and Preservation of Democratic Institutions." The six articles in that
Chapter outline mechanisms to defend democracy .11 This is the legal
section of the Democratic Charter and the focus of this article.
I.

CREATION

In August 2001, an OAS Working Group edited and revised more
than a dozen drafts of the Democratic Charter, which the General
Assembly had failed to approve at its meeting the previous June. The
Democratic Charter almost was not approved, or at least foreign
ministers almost went to Lima, Peru, with an open text. There were
several disputes ranging from changing the title of the document to
whether specific human rights treaties that not all states had ratified
could be mentioned in the document. However, every future General
Assembly will now follow up on the Democratic Charter as it has
become a permanent agenda item for the General Assembly's annual
meetings every June. 12
The Democratic Charter fits in with the annual theme of the ASIL
this year: "New World Order or a World in Disorder? Testing the
7. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1.
8. See Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, In Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM L. REV. 283, 283 (2004) [hereinafter Lagos & Rudy] (noting that all active
member states of the OAS were democracies at the time the Democratic Charter was
adopted).
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text; see generally Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47 (2002) [hereinafter
Franck] (recognizing that legal entitlement to democracy is created with the help of regional
and international organizations).
10. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 1 (emphasis added).
11. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text (discussing the legal articles in the
Democratic Charter that may be used to defend democracy); see also Lagos & Rudy, supra
note 8.
12. Promotion and Strengthening of Democracy: Follow-up to the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, AG/RES. 1957 (XXXIV-0/03), ~ 4 (June 10, 2003) (explaining that
the purpose for having this issue as a permanent agenda topic is "so that member states that
deem it appropriate will report on their progress in promoting, publicizing, and
implementing the Inter-American Democratic Charter").
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Limits of International Law."
The OAS adopted the Democratic Charter, as its long preamble
makes clear, to solidify previous strides made in the 1990s to strengthen
the OAS' decades-old standard of democracy .13 That standard is "the
effective exercise of representative democracy," which is found in the
OAS Charter, the treaty that established the OAS in 1948. 14
II.

SOFTLAW

To borrow some terms from the ASIL's 99th meeting program, the
Democratic Charter curiously has both robust and gentle provisions. It
modifies existing rules and practices, most of which are no more than
fifteen years old. Both strong and weak states occupy at least a fictional
level playing field. On its face, the Democratic Charter does not
differentiate between those countries that were once Spanish colonies
and those that were once English colonies. And it only provides for
intervention to preserve and restore democracy if that intervention is
multilateral. Its sanction is not the use of force. For that, recourse to
the U.N. is needed.
Rather, its strongest sanction suspends a
government from participation in the international organization itself.
Because the Democratic Charter's success will depend on the
political will of the member governments, it is arguably more of a
political rather than a legal document. In this development, the
Democratic Charter resembles what the Annual Meeting's organizers
have described as the tendency to supplant classical sources of
international law-in this case the OAS treaty or charter-with soft law
in the form of a non-binding resolution of an international organization.
In the 1990s, the OAS Charter was amended by the Protocol of
Washington, which provides for the suspension of a member state's
government in the case of coups. 15 The Protocol of Washington became
effective in 1997 and can be found today in Article 9, of the OAS
Charter. 16

13. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, paras. 14-17 (listing other instruments
promoting and defending democracy upon which the Democratic Charter rests).
14. See OAS Charter, supra note 3, art. 3(d), at 990.
15. See Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
opened for signature Dec. 14, 1992, art. 9, 33 l.L.M. 1005.
16. OAS Charter, supra note 3, art. 9. Article 9 reads:
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the
Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the
commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.
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The relationship between the Democratic Charter and the OAS
Charter was a matter that concerned the delegates in the summer of
2001. They sought advice from the Inter-American Juridical Committee
(IAJC), another OAS body of elected jurists and legal scholars. 17 The
IAJC said in its special report of August 2001, at paragraph 5 that:
The provisions of resolutions of this nature generally have as their
purpose the interpretation of treaty provisions; the provision of
evidence of the existence of customary norms. . . . The provisions of
some resolutions of an organ of an international organization may
have an obligatory effect ... 18

and said further at paragraph 40 of that report:
[I]t would be unnecessary to amend the OAS Charter, provided that
the text of the Democratic Charter explicitly states that it is setting
forth an interpretation of the OAS Charter, and assuming, of course,
that the Democratic Charter is adopted by consensus. 19

a) The power to suspend shall be exercised only when such diplomatic initiatives
undertaken by the Organization for the purpose of promoting the restoration of
representative democracy in the affected Member State have been unsuccessful;
b) The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a special session of the General
Assembly by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Member States;
c) The suspension shall take effect immediately following its approval by the
General Assembly;
d) The suspension notwithstanding, the Organization shall endeavor to undertake
additional diplomatic initiatives to contribute to the re-establishment of
representative democracy in the affected Member State;
e) The Member which has been subject to suspension shall continue to fulfill its
obligations to the Organization;
f) The General Assembly may lift the suspension by a decision adopted with the
approval of two-thirds of the Member States;
g) The powers referred to in this article shall be exercised in accordance with
this Charter.
Id.

17. Article 99 of the OAS Charter defines the purpose of the IAJC as:
The purpose of the Inter-American Juridical Committee is to serve the Organization
as an advisory body on juridical matters; to promote the progressive development
and the codification of international law; and to study juridical problems related to
the integration of the developing countries of the Hemisphere and, insofar as may
appear desirable, the possibility of attaining uniformity in their legislation.
OAS Charter, supra note 3, art. 99.
18. CJI Res. 32, ~ 5, LIX 0/01 (Aug. 24, 2001) in Annual Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly, OEA/Ser.QNI.32, doc. 79 (2001).
19. Id.~ 40.
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This is what the OAS attempted to do. Two paragraphs were
inserted in the preamble of the Democratic Charter to clarify that the
resolution adopting the Democratic Charter was the unanimous
interpretation of Article 9 of the OAS Charter. 20 The member states
unanimously approved the resolution by consensus on September 11,
2001, and, in fact, signed the document. However, not all the member
states have adopted the Protocol of Washington. 21 So the OAS may
have future legal headaches if it decides to invoke the Democratic
Charter to suspend the government of a nation that has never ratified the
Protocol of Washington. 22
20. The two paragraphs read as follows:
RECOGNIZING that all the rights and obligations of member states under the OAS
Charter represent the foundation on which democratic principles in the Hemisphere
are built; and
BEARING IN MIND the progressive development of international law and the
advisability of clarifying the provisions set forth in the OAS Charter and related
basic instruments on the preservation and defense of democratic institutions,
according to established practice.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, preamble paras. 19, 20.
21. The countries that have not ratified the Protocol of Washington are: Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia,
Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. Organization of American States, A-56: Protocol of
Amendments to Charter of the Organization of American States, "Protocol of Washington,"
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.3, "General Information of the Treaty" (Dec. 14, 1992),
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-56.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
22. The general rule for interpreting treaties is found in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and is as follows:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose on the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
a. any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
b. any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a. any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
b. any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
c. any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Ill. GENTLE AND ROBUST

Governments and OAS bodies may be reluctant to go beyond
rhetoric and invoke the mechanisms of the Democratic Charter to
defend democracy. The Democratic Charter is a political document
often cited, mainly for its "purposes and principles," such as ·the
"essential elements of representative democracy" found in Articles 3
and 4. 23
To date, the OAS has had limited experience with Chapter IV
episodes, so the pro-democracy mechanisms of the instrument must be
understood principally from the actual text of Chapter IV. (However,
after the ASIL conference, the Democratic Charter was invoked twice in
the spring of 2005.)
Article 17 applies when the government of a member state claims
that its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate
exercise of power is "at risk." 24 The Secretary General or the
Permanent Council receive the state's request. 25 Under Article 17, the
Democratic Charter applies when the government of the country makes
its request for assistance from the OAS.
Article 18 applies when the development of a member state's
democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of its
power are affected by "situations" in the member state. 26 However, as
23. These elements are listed in Article 3 as:
... respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise
of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair
elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the
sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and
organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of
government.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 3.
Article 4 reads:
Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on
the part of governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of
the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy.
The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted
civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and
sectors of society are equally essential to democracy.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 4.
24. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 17. Article 17 reads:
When the government of a member state considers that its democratic political
institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request
assistance from the Secretary General or the Permanent Council for the
strengthening and preservation of its democratic system.
Id.

25. Id.
26. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 18. Article 18 reads, in relevant part:
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in the case with Article 17, the consent of the state is required, at least
prior to the Secretary General or the Permanent Council taking certain
actions. 27 The current government must consent to visits by the
Secretary General or "other actions" by the Permanent Council. 28
Article 18 appears to assign the initiative not to the affected member
state, but to the Secretary General or the Permanent Council.
Articles 17 and 18 make the Democratic Charter difficult to use
when the consent of the state is required and unlikely to be granted, but
recent invocations of the Democratic Charter by the governments of
Ecuador2 9 and Nicaragua30 suggest that member states may have fewer
qualms about requesting diplomatic support in times of crisis by
appealing to Chapter IV of the Democratic Charter. Note, however, that
no other state has made such a request in the first four years after the
Democratic Charter was approved.
Now let's look at the robust provisions of Chapter IV.
Article 19 is a statement of purpose. It reflects the Democracy
Clause adopted at the Third Summit of the Americas. Article 19 states
the policy of the inter-American system that "an unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of
the constitutional regime" that rises to the level of a serious impairment
of the democratic order in an OAS member state is "an insurmountable
obstacle" to the participation of that member state's government in
official hemispheric bodies and meetings. 31
But the standard permitting the OAS to take action under the
Democratic Charter is found in Article 20, and it is worded slightly

When situations arise in a member state that may affect the development of its
democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power, the
Secretary General or the Permanent Council may, with prior consent of the
government concerned, arrange for visits or other actions in order to analyze the
situation.
Id.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Support by the Organization of American States for the Republic of Ecuador,
CP/Res. 880 (1478/05), ~ 3 (April 22, 2005) (citing Article 18 of the Democratic Charter,
Ecuador invites an OAS mission to visit); Support to the Republic of Ecuador by the
Organization of American States, CP/Res. 883 (1484/05), ~ 3 (May 20, 2005) (supporting
Ecuador in the context of Article 18 of the Democratic Charter "with a view to contributing
to the stability of democratic institutions in that country").
30. The government of Nicaragua invoked Art. 18 of the Democratic Charter in the
spring of 2005 and requested an on-site OAS mission, which the General Assembly granted
on June 7, 2005. See Support to Nicaragua, supra note 4, preamble para. 4.
31. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 19.
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differently than the Democracy Clause and Article 19. 32 Whether the
factual situation can be characterized to meet the Article 20 standard in
the opinion of a majority of the member states is probably more of a
political question than a legal argument. Further, under Article 21 of
the Democratic Charter (and Article 9 of the OAS Charter), only the
General Assembly can suspend a member state's participation in OAS
bodies. 33 In spite of the "insurmountable" language of Article 19,
suspension is not automatic. 34
The Secretary General or the Permanent Council do not have to
receive the state's consent when utilizing Article 20. The grant of
authority to the Permanent Council in the first paragraph of Article 20
appears to be plenary. 35 The Council is permitted to make a "collective
assessment of the situation," and may "take such decisions as it (the
Permanent Council) deems appropriate. " 36 The Permanent Council
moved under Article 20 in April 2002 after the coup against Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, 37 and the General Assembly cited Article 20 in

32. See Lagos & Rudy, supra note 8, at 294. Compare Declaration of Quebec City, in
Official Documents From the Summits of the Americas Process From Miami to Quebec
City 313, 313 (OAS Office of Summit Follow-up, 2002), available at http://www.summitamericas.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) (stating in the Democracy Clause, in relevant part:
"[A]ny unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the
Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's
government in the Summit of the Americas process") with Democratic Charter, supra note
1, art. 19 (stating, in part "an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic
order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its
government's participation in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of
Consultation, the Councils of the Organization, the specialized conferences, the
commissions, working groups, and other bodies of the Organization").
33. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 21 (noting "[w]hen the special session of
the General Assembly determines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the
democratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special
session shall take the decision to suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to
participate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states in
accordance with the Charter of the OAS"). See note 16 for the full text of Article 9 of the
OAS Charter.
34. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 19.
35. The first paragraph of Article 20 reads:
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the
Secretary General may request immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to
undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it
deems appropriate.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
36. Id.
37. See Situation in Venezuela, CPIRES. 811 (1315/02), ~ 6 (April 13, 2002)
(convening a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the coup pursuant to
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a resolution on Haiti, but more than three months after the
democratically-elected President had been forced from office. 38 The
OAS took no subsequent action regarding the Haitian President under
the Democratic Charter in the intervening year. 39
Under Article 20, any member state or the Secretary General can
ask for a Permanent Council meeting when the facts on the ground rise
to the level of an "unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional
regime that seriously impairs the democratic order. " 40
Politicians and special interest groups in troubled states in the
future will want to interpret the facts in their countries as meeting this
standard during times of crisis if they want the Democratic Charter to
apply. I predict that many citizens and civil society organizations will
be petitioning for action under the Democratic Charter when the facts
do not rise to the level of this standard. Chapter IV is silent as to how to
define this standard. But it does suggest that the Secretary General, or
the other states, will determine if the standard is met.
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, in a lecture at the OAS in
January 2005, provided what he called "clear definition[s]" for Chapter
IV's "unconstitutional alteration or interruption" standards. 41 He
provided the following eight examples as situations meeting his
definition of the undefined standards:
1. Violation of the integrity of central institutions, including
constitutional checks and balances providing for the separation of
powers.
2. Holding of elections that do not meet minimal international

Article 20 of the Democratic Charter).
38. Situation in Haiti: Strengthening of Democracy, AG/RES. 2058 (X:XXIV-0/04), ii
4 (June 8, 2004), http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ag02528e08.doc (last visited Dec. 30,
2005) ("[t]o instruct the Permanent Council to undertake, in accordance with the principles
and purposes of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including Article 20, all necessary
diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster full restoration of democracy in
Haiti").
39. In May 2004, twelve Caribbean countries unsuccessfully requested a special
session of the OAS Permanent Council to invoke Article 20 in the case of Haiti. OEA/Ser.G
CP/INF.
1425/04
(June
17,
2004),
available
at
http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISHIHIST_04/CPl3069E05.DOC (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
40. See Democratic Charter, supra note 35, art. 20.
41. Jimmy Carter, Former President of the United States, The Promise and Peril of
Democracy, Speech at the OAS Inaugural Lecture Series of the Americas (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.funglode.org/menu/noticias/2005/01/discursocarter.pdf (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
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standards.
3. Failure to hold periodic elections or to respect electoral outcomes.
4. Systematic violation of basic freedoms, including freedom of
expression, freedom of association, or respect for minority rights.
5. Unconstitutional termination of the tenure in office of any legally
elected official.
6. Arbitrary or illegal, removal or interference in the appointment or
deliberations of members of the judiciary or electoral bodies.
7. Interference by non-elected officials, such as military officers, in
the jurisdiction of elected officials.
8. Systematic use of public office to silence, harass, or disrupt the
normal and legal activities of members of the political opposition, the
press, or civil society. 42

Curiously, the standard used in Article 21 is a bit different from
that found in Articles 19 and 20. Article 21 reads "unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order," whereas Article 19 uses the
language "an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime" and Article 20
reads "an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime.''4 3
The remainder of Article 20 permits the OAS General Assembly
and the Permanent Council to undertake diplomatic initiatives. 44
Finally, Articles 21 and 22 track the OAS Charter by requiring a
two thirds voting procedure when suspending and readmitting a member
state. 45
CONCLUSION

In the past four years, the people of Venezuela have suffered one
failed coup and several arguably anti-democratic developments. The
42. Id.
43. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, arts. 19, 20, & 21.
44. See id., art. 20 (providing that "[t]he Permanent Council, depending on the
situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to
foster the restoration of democracy").
45. See id., art. 21 (mandating that if the General Assembly decides that "there has
been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order" within a member state, the
other member states may, through "an affirmative vote of two thirds," decide to suspend that
member state); See id., art. 22 (requiring a two thirds vote of the member states in order to
lift the suspension "[ o]nee the situation that led to suspension has been resolved").
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Presidents of Haiti, Bolivia (two leaders), and Ecuador have been
removed from office in various scenarios that arguably were not
democratic and were questionable from the standpoint of their domestic
constitutions. The Democratic Charter is neither a magic bullet nor a
panacea for what ails democracy in the W estem Hemisphere. But, as
the examples of Nicaragua and Ecuador show, the Democratic Charter
can be a preventive diplomatic device that may put anti-democrats on
the defensive.
Any passion for democracy at the OAS, however, may be
weakening as notions of sovereignty and the inter-American norm of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a nation state reassert
themselves. 46 The United States may have overplayed its hand
politically in the spring of 2005, when it pushed for an OAS permanent
committee to evaluate democracy in the hemisphere, but did not
prevail. 47 The OAS General Assembly compromised by asking the
Secretary General to report on the Democratic Charter's implementation
to date and to prepare proposals for cooperation when anti-democratic
situations arise. But those proposals must be limited by the provisions
of Chapter IV of the Democratic Charter; the right of selfdetermination; and the principle of non-intervention. 48 Obviously, both
the norm of a legal right to democracy in the Americas and the
Democratic Charter itself are still evolving.

46. OAS Charter, supra note 3, arts. 19, 20.
47. See, e.g., How to protect Latin American democracy, THE ECONOMIST, June 11,
2005, at 10 (pointing out that Latin America no longer automatically follows Washington,
as evidenced by the fact that although American diplomats pushed for a permanent
committee to be created to police the practice of democracy in the Americas, the foreign
ministers "diluted the American initiative"); Joel Brinkley, Latin States Shun U.S. Plan to
Watch Over Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A8 (noting that the U.S. plan ran into
opposition by several Latin American countries calling for a less-intrusive plan).
48. Declaration of Florida, supra note 2, ~~ 2, 3.
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